

incorporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the universe, original and underived from any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. Epicurus suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake, concerning qualities, to this purpose: — " Non sic cogitandae sunt qualitates, quasi sint quaedam per se existentes naturae sen substantial, siquidem id mente assequi non licet; sed solummodo ut varii modi sese habendi corporis considerandae sunt."

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, site, motion, or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, causing different fancies* Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their first matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it), because it receives all qualities, to be itself devoid of all quality ; so we conclude, that atoms (which are really the first principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not absolutely of themselves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arising up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which Lucretius confirms by this reason, agreeable to the tenour of the Atomical philosophy, that if there were any such real qualities in the first principles, then, in the various corruptions of nature, things would at last be reduced to nothing: